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Towards a Political Analysis of Markets in North 
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Park, Hyeong Jung**
There are two ways to analyze the market in North Korea. Economic analyses comprise the 
study of marketization from below, the dual economy (formal and informal), and market 
expansion as threat to the planned system and the regime. In contrast, political analyses are 
concerned with the economic structure as a reflection of the distribution of political power. 
These two approaches to analysis of market in North Korea are compared. In contrast to the 
economic analysis, the political analysis asserts the following: Market expansion has been 
boosted by trading companies run by powerful military and party organizations and the 
cabinet, and has contributed to regime maintenance and the regime’s grip on the economy; 
The state intervened regularly in the process of market expansion and shaped the latter 
in favor of rent extraction; With market expansion, the North Korean economy can be 
characterized as a hybrid of state and market.
Keywords: market, plan, hybrid economy, dual economy, political power
I. IntroductIon
there have been several efforts to understand the market in north Korea, 
which has expanded rapidly since the mid-1990s. The market in north Korea 
has been usually understood more or less as purely economic affairs. the 
media’s interpretation of market expansion has also been based on economic 
analysis. the market has presumably developed “from below” and its rapid 
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expansion would undermine the planned economy and the stability of the 
regime. This kind of analysis has tended to ignore the intrinsic role of power 
and politics in the expansion of market. 
In the meantime, other interpretations of the market have emerged. 
Political analyses regard the north Korean market as political unit, where “the 
structure and operation of the market are influenced by power and power 
relations in various ways” (White 1993, 2). Such analyses argue that market 
expansion in north Korea have been structured and maintained through 
intensive intervention of the power and politics. 
this paper presents a political analysis of the market, while critiquing 
the economic analyses of market expansion in north Korea. Section 2 will 
explain main frame of the political analysis. Political institutions are found to 
play a determining role in the performance of economic institutions, and of 
the market. Section 3 will summarize main thesis on market in north Korea 
in the economic analysis. Section 4 will present the theses of political analysis 
of the market in north Korea. It will explain that the strongly centralized 
system of political power is reflected in the structure and operation of the 
north Korean market. 
II. WhAt IS the PolItIcAl AnAlySIS oF the mArKet? 
The political analysis is concerned with the ways in which power and power 
relations influence the structure and operation of the real market. This type 
of analysis can be critical of and offer alternatives to the prevailing dominant 
economic analyses, which usually underestimate the presence of power and 
politics in north Korea’s market. 
the political analysis of the market is based on two premises. the first 
premise is that political institutions determine economic policy choices, 
economic performance, and the characteristics of the market. the second 
premise is that the same institutions would function differently in different 
countries. let’s elaborate the first point. According to new institutionalism, 
political institutions determine the economic ones (Acemoglu, Johnson and 
robinson 2004, 6), and the polity, which determines and implements the rule 
of games, is the first source of economic performance (north 2003, 7). The 
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political structure should be reflected in the economic institutions, because 
the distribution of benefits in a society, supported by economic institutions, 
should be in agreement with distribution of power in the society. If powerful 
groups are not getting an acceptable distribution of benefits from an 
institutional structure, they will strive to change it (Khan 2010, 4). Therefore, 
in a stable social order, the distribution of benefits reflects the distribution 
of power. Political settlements are manifested “in the structure of property 
rights and entitlements, which give some social actors more distributional 
advantages than others, and in the regulatory structure of the state” (John 
and Putzel 2009, 4). In the same sense, the market is patterned by power, and 
it is not purely an economic mechanism independent of politics and power. 
Political power relations engage with the market structure and relations 
of exchange, thereby making the latter’s “characteristic economic features 
embody political process of conflict and cooperation and political relations of 
domination and subordination” (White 1993, 3). Prices in the market are also 
influenced by political constellations. 
This insight of “institutional hierarchy” can be applied not only to north 
Korea or to dictatorships, but also to market democracies. Acemoglu and 
robinson differentiate inclusive (political and economic) institutions, 
which promote economic prosperity, from extractive ones, which 
bring economic stagnation. their theses can be summarized as follows 
(Acemoglu and robinson 2012, 73-76, 80-82). In extractive institutions, 
power is concentrated in the hands of a few elites, and there are virtually 
no constraints on its use. here “extractive” means that the institutions are 
designed to transfer revenue and wealth from one part of society to benefit 
another (Acemoglu and robinson 2012, 76). here politicians are constrained 
relatively minimally in their pursuit of narrow self-interests. The governments 
run by them function as “grabbing hands” (Shleifer and Vishny 2002, 3). The 
concentration of power deters opposition to politicians’ attempts to structure 
the economic institutions in favor of extraction. extractive institutions make 
elites richer and their economic power perpetuates their political power. 
In contrast, inclusive institutions limit the arbitrary exercise of power 
through its dispersion in the society. Inclusive political institutions make it 
difficult for anyone to usurp power. the state functions as ‘helping hands’ 
(Shleifer and Vishny 2002), while enacting secure property rights, an 
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impartial legal system, and fair exchange and trade. The security of property 
rights is the most important, because it ensures that people will invest and 
increase their productivity. Inclusive institutions create inclusive markets, 
without entry barriers, and with competition, property rights and contract 
enforcement. they decrease transaction costs, inhibit rent-seeking, and 
promote investment and productive endeavors. 
Though extractive institutions share institutions such as market, election, 
political party, and mass media with inclusive ones, they function differently 
(north, Wallis and Weingast 2009; Albrecht 2008). In inclusive institutions, 
economic organizations have most of their relations with the market and only 
incidentally with politics (north, Wallis and Weingast 2009, 146). market 
and a democratic political system are kept separate, because businesses 
concentrate on the economy. In addition, markets in inclusive institutions 
guarantee open entry and competition, free movement of wealth and 
people, entrepreneurialism, and prohibit extortion. In contrast, in case of 
extractive institutions, politics and the economy are integrated. In extractive 
institutions, there is limited access to the market, much more privilege, much 
less competition, and much more rent-seeking (north, Wallis and Weingast 
2009, 139). economic structure is adjusted to foreign currency earning 
through export of primary goods, and to creation of privileges and rents, and 
thereby increases the wealth of the powerful. In such an economy, the state 
does not supply public goods in favor of increasing employment, the public 
welfare, and manufacturing (callaghy 1988; hutchcroft 1998; Auty 2001). In 
inclusive institutions, the markets are separated from politics and promote 
economic growth. In contrast, the extractive markets are part of extractive 
institutions, in which politics and economy are integrated, and are managed 
to contribute to create privileges and rents. these conditions stabilize the 
regime, but perpetuate economic stagnation and poverty (Acemoglu and 
robinson 2012, 437-445; olson 2000). 
north Korea is as a country based on extractive institutions. When we 
talk about, however, a market, we in general imagine a market embedded 
in inclusive institutions. Such a market is distinguished by secure private 
property rights, impartial law system, fair playground in the exchange and 
trade, all provided by the state. The market in north Korea, however, is based 
on absence of secure property rights and rule of law, and on the inequality 
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of opportunities in the exchange and trade due to trade barriers and biased 
provision of business licenses by the state. In this sense, market in north 
Korea is a “quasi-market” (nee 1989, 664). 
It does, however, shares the features of markets in countries with extractive 
institutions. This does not mean that market in north Korea is all the same as 
the one in other countries of extractive institutions. This is because political 
settlements are different in each country and thereby produce different 
forms of extractive institutions. market in each country reflects the power 
distribution of the country and is structured and operated differently. 
III.  mAIn theSeS oF the economIc AnAlySIS on the 
mArKet In north KoreA
economic analyses have traditionally held the dominant position in 
studies on market in north Korea. the economic analysis has put forward 
major theses regarding north Korean market, which have become the 
essential elements of common sense perception. It has shown tendency to 
be differentiated and diversified, while subjects have been taken such as 
assessments on size of the market, the degree of maturation, the relations 
between household and market, major features of sector markets, the effects 
of market expansion on the planned sector and potentialities for dissidence, 
etc.1 The main features of economic analysis can be summarized as follows. 
economic analysis assumes a duality of the north Korea economy made 
of formal and informal activities. Kim and yang (2012, 16) defines market 
activities as those which “exist outside the central plan” or which “are barely 
covered by legal protection,” while identifying them with informal economic 
activities. yang mun Su maintains that the dual structure of plan and 
market was established after the July 1measures for Improving economic 
management in 2002. According to him, the state controls the planned sector, 
which comprises elite economy (party-economy), military economy, and 
1 comprehensive introduction and comments on economic analysis on north Korean 
market by South Korean economists can be found, Kim and yang 2012, 4-5; as 
examples of foreign studies, haggard and noland 2011; Joo 2010. 
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cabinet economy. conversely, the economic activities of the population and 
part of the cabinet economy have been freed from management by the state 
plan and allowed as areas of market activities (Kim and yang 2012, 67). lim 
Gang taek differentiates the formal planned sector from the informal market 
sector, which is freed from state control and regulation. he asserts that, 
though marketization is more advanced in the informal sector, it has been 
similarly been increasing in the planned sector (lim Gang taek 2009, 93-98; 
Kim and yang 2012). 
economic analysis maintains the thesis of “marketization below”(lim 
Gang taek 2009, 93; Kim and yang 2012, 98). According to this theory, 
market expansion has been promoted by “self-support economic activities 
outside the plan, done by secondary economic actors such as small state 
firms and households” (yang mun Su 2010, 269) to cope with the demise 
of planned economy and state ration. Kim Byeong yeon put forward a 
representative theory, which posited two types of market activity. First, 
market activities, which are registered and/or pay taxes, such as selling stall 
and private business based on leased assets of the state firms. Second, market 
activities, unregistered and/or do not pay taxes, such as household plots, sale 
of products thereof, small merchants without legal permits, and smuggling 
(Kim and yang 2012, 15). In short, the market is composed of self-supporting 
activities of secondary economic entities. 
According to the two theses of economic analysis, north Korea’s market 
is composed of ‘numerous examples of exchanges between individuals’ for 
self-support by secondary economic entities such as small state firms and 
households. This kind of market is separate and independent from the formal 
or planned sector under the control and regulation by the state and from 
power relations in the society. Accordingly, the informal sector or the market 
is regarded as a relatively independent area, dominated by non-political and 
pure ‘market mechanisms’ such as laws of supply and demand. 
Third, the economic analysis tends to think that expansion of market or 
informal sector encroaches upon the planned sector and pose risk and threat 
to the regime (lim Gang taek 2009, 115; Kim and yang 2012, 17). With this 
regard, the following theses are asserted: informal sector would gradually 
increase and eat into planned sector; marketization is irreversible because 
of increased dependence of planned sector on the market economy and of 
  towards a Political Analysis of markets in north Korea 201
decreased capacity of the regime to control the market (Kim and yang 2012, 
24-25, 51-52); market expansion would widen the disparity between rich and 
poor through corrupt relations between politics and economy, and exacerbate 
socio-political instability through increase of corruption and crimes, thereby 
weakening the state’s public capacity (yang mun Su 2010, 97). 
the theses of economic analysis contradict basic understandings of 
political analyses of the market in two ways. Whereas the economic analysis 
perceives the market in north Korea as independent from political power, 
political analysis asserts that the economic system, including the market, 
reflects the constellation of political power and interest. moreover, while 
the economic analysis is based on the assumption that market exists and 
functions in the same manner everywhere, political analysis asserts that 
similar institutions operate differently in each country. 
IV.  mAIn theSeS oF the PolItIcAl AnAlySIS oF 
mArKet In north KoreA 
The political analysis of the market implies that the structure and operation of 
the market are influenced by power and power relations and that the market 
can be conceived as a political unit. Political analyses of north Korea’s market 
make arguments that contradict those of economic analyses. The main theses 
of political and economic analyses will be compared. 
1. The Leading Actors in Market Expansion 
As stated earlier, economic analysis is based on the idea of “marketization 
from below,” according to which market expansion has been driven by “self-
support economic activities outside the plan, done by secondary economic 
actors such as small state firms and households.” In contrast, the political 
analysis posits that the market expansion has been driven by commercial 
activities of the major power organizations of the regime. their origin is 
traceable to the central party organizations of the mid-1970s that  had to 
raise funds to support the transition of power from Kim Il-Sung to Kim Jong-
Il (Kim Kwang Jin 2008; cha mun Seok 2009). these activities included 
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mobilizing and compensating workers for collecting export goods for foreign 
currency such as song-i mushrooms and alluvial gold, and then organizing 
its transport and export. the people responsible for collecting exportable 
natural products were rewarded with luxury goods such as sugar, watches, 
and television sets, which they traded for necessities in local Jangmadnag 
market places. At the same time, the networks of special stores for foreign 
goods, where foreign currency earned by such activities could be spent, were 
expanded. All those activities, driven by the central party and Kim Jong-Il, 
increased commercial exchanges in north Korea (choi Jin I 2012, 146-148). 
In addition to the central party organizations, by the late 1980s, and early 
1990s, the military and youth organizations, were also allowed to earn foreign 
currency through commercial activities (lim Keun o 2010, 22). 
Park hyeong Jung asserts that the “regime organizations and merchants 
associated with them, who have enjoyed protection by power and privileges, 
have been the leading actors and dominant players in the market expansion” 
(2011, 215). choi Bong dae maintains that “the major propulsive power for 
market expansion has been originated from all sided development of activities 
for foreign currency earning through export and import by such ‘special 
units’ including office 38 and 39 of the central party, the Second economy 
in charge of military weapons production, and other powerful offices of the 
central party, the Security Guard for Kim Jong-Il, the ministry of People’s 
Armed Forces, the ministry of State Security, the ministry of Public Security 
etc.” (2011, 13). hong min argues that “the activation of the market has been 
driven by intervention, activities, and interests of the commercial companies 
and subsidiary units affiliated with the party, the cabinet, and the military” 
(2012, 50). 
2.  The Hierarchical and Monopolistic Structure of the North Korean 
Market 
According to political analyses, the market in north Korea reflects the 
hierarchical and monopolistic distribution and structure of power. In 
contrast, economic analysis presumes that marketization is promoted by self-
support activities of the secondary economic units such as small state firms 
and households, in other words, that it is perceived as numerous examples of 
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exchanges among equal partners. 
In a nutshell, the economic analysis ignores the hierarchical and 
monopolistic structures of north Korea’s market. For example, though one 
of the economic analyses mentions that “the trading companies have played 
important roles in promoting marketization in north Korea,” the trading 
companies are perceived merely as technical distribution units for export and 
import (Kim and yang 2012, 116). 
In reality, the trading companies are subsidiaries of powerful regime 
organizations and enjoy privileges and extra profits of monopolies under 
political protection. In turn, they fund the operations that are essential to 
regime survival. The existence and operation of trading companies therefore 
cannot be understood without considering the intervention of power. They 
are established by political power for political purposes, enjoy the top positions 
in the monopoly hierarchies, and are guaranteed extra profits. In this respect, 
they have unrivaled advantages to other market players. 
Park hyeong Jung states that the “trading companies affiliated with 
powerful regime organizations has made up the upper echelon of the market 
in north Korea, dominated the commercial infrastructure directly or co-
opted the spontaneously emerged activities and agents related with market, 
and make them subservient” (2011, 215). choi Bong dae argues that on 
the ladder of commercial activities, the offices for foreign currency earning 
of party-state organizations occupy the top rung. on the next rung are the 
big private money holders, and several rungs lower are retail sellers and 
producers for exportable natural goods (2011, 13). hong min also identifies 
several rungs in the market hierarchy. At the top are companies for foreign 
currency earning affiliated with the party, the cabinet, and the military; 
below are, private money holders, who are affiliated with trading companies 
and mobilize capital and organize work forces and trading activities; below 
them are local production unit managers, usually private persons, and local 
power organizations including provincial party organizations, city and 
county People’s committee, and local police stations.  on the lowest rungs 
are people, who take part in commercial activities for daily subsistence (hong 
min 2012, 59-61). 
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3.  The Hierarchical Structure of the Market and the Structured 
Predation 
the north Korean market is also characterized by rent appropriation and 
exploitation of the weaker by the stronger. the tendency for the rich to 
become richer and the poor poorer is ingrained in the market structure 
of north Korea. though the economic analysis confirms that the same 
tendency is at work in north Korean market (Kim and yang 2012, 101-102), 
it originated more from circumstantial factors in market expansion rather 
than from the market structure itself. It has been argued that the crackdowns 
on market since 2007 have strengthened the collusion between money and 
power, which has made the rich richer and the poor poorer. In other words, 
the intensified market crackdowns have changed the structure of the north 
Korean market.
In contrast, political analyses are concerned with disparities in power 
and market dominance among participants in north Korean market, 
therefore with the hierarchical structure of the market. The powerful regime 
organizations, the drivers of market expansion, are distributed monopoly 
rights (waku) for export and import, made up of certain volume of goods 
or of certain amount of foreign currency for certain duration, by Kim Jong-
Il (lim Gang taek et al. 2011, 83-110). Kim Jong-Il distributes licenses for 
export and import to regime organizations, based on his judgment about 
each organization’s contribution to the regime survival. only organizations, 
bestowed with trade licenses by Kim-Jong-Il, are allowed for export and 
import in permitted areas. In this way, the top leader guarantees extra profits 
to chosen regime organizations through his political intervention and his 
selective assignments of monopoly trade rights. A set of regime agencies 
and groups enjoys preferential treatments by the top leader Kim Jong-Il and 
repays him accordingly with payoffs and loyalty.2
trading companies affiliated with and operated by powerful regime 
2 one way for a dictator to maintain power, is to distribute privileges among power 
groups in exchange for their loyalty (tullock 1986; mesquita and Smith 2012; 
Wedeman 2012). 
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organizations are guaranteed monopolistic profits through the market 
positions of monopolistic buyers and sellers. Several companies enjoy being 
monopolistic or oligopolistic buyers for certain exportable natural goods. 
they dominate the process of collection and/or extraction, transport and 
export of these commodities. the backbone of the “marketization from 
below” is no more than expansion of commercial activities as related with 
production/collection, transport and export of extractive natural goods. 
the trading companies earn profits while taking advantage of the wide 
gaps between international and domestic prices of export goods. they also 
have monopoly import licenses for certain goods and dominate internal 
distribution chains. Foreign currency revenue earned is partly paid to 
Kim Jong-Il, partly for self-support expenditures for operation of regime 
organizations, and the other part is for private enrichment of corrupt officials 
and share of private entrepreneurs. 
thus, trading companies run by powerful regime organizations enjoy 
market dominating positions of monopoly and oligopoly over producers and 
distributors located on lower rungs of the market. The asymmetrical power 
relations between trading companies and subsistent producers and merchants 
are reflected in the huge difference in profit levels. According to Park hyeong 
Jung, “this system guarantees monopolistic profits to Kim Jong-Il/Kim Jong-
un and ‘special units’ of the regime at the cost of state property and general 
population” (2012, 3). hong min asserts that diverse powerful regime 
organizations have colluded to appropriate surpluses produced by the market, 
while taking advantage of their public function (2012, 63).
4. North Korean Economy as Hybrid of Formal and Informal
economic analyses claim that the north Korean economy is made up of two 
independent sectors: formal and informal, or planned economy and market 
economy. north Korean economy is, however, rather perceived as a hybrid 
one of both components, because the duality can hardly be maintained 
analytically in the real world. 
The mainstay of the north Korean economy is no longer the state firms 
embedded in the official plan system, but the commercial trading companies, 
established outside the plan system and run by the party, military, and 
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cabinet (Park hyeong Jung 2009, 48-50). As the plan system lost coherence 
and ability to supply conditions for plan fulfillment, the state firms have been 
set in operation more and more not by the plan system but by the money 
and commercial connections supplied by market activities of the trading 
companies and other non-plan actors. In this sense, the fusion rather than 
separation of “formal” and “informal” are the rule, because the “planned” 
or “formal” sector is permeated by market or informal activities. In many 
cases, the state firms engage in commercial activities to earn revenues to send 
payments above as fulfillment of plan obligation.
to elaborate, the economic analysis has underestimated the importance 
of commercial trading companies outside the framework of the plan, while 
sticking to the traditional perception of the north Korean economy as made 
of plan and state firms. they monopolize the export and import of north 
Korea, and dominate the chains both of extraction, collection, and export of 
primary products and of commercial distribution and sale of imported goods. 
They are neither state firms owned by the ‘people’ nor under direct direction 
of state plan, but are subsidiaries of regime organizations for financial self-
support and run by commercial principles outside the plan with politically 
guaranteed special privileges. they combine public and private elements. 
on the public side, they can take advantage of public competence, asset, 
and workforce of the regime organizations, and on the private side, capital 
and commercial and management talents of private entrepreneurs. While 
the regime organizations provide private entrepreneurs with investment 
opportunities and political protection, the latter bring regular payments to 
the former. under this quasi-contract, the private entrepreneurs are given 
some official titles related with public function of the regime organizations, 
and are allowed to conduct private businesses in the guise of public affairs. 
the revenues are divided between the host organization and the private 
entrepreneurs and used as operational funds in case of the former, and as 
a source of private enrichment in the latter. though this process produces 
private entrepreneurs with significant capital, they will support the regime 
because their survival depends on their political connection to the market.  
In north Korea, the planned economy or the formal sectors have been 
penetrated by and survive through market activities. Though most of the state 
firms are still officially in operation on plan principles, they are similar to 
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those of the trading companies run by regime organizations outside the plan. 
the state firms are bound to fulfill the plan directives, though they are no 
longer supplied with resources from above. Therefore the state firms in formal 
sectors must fulfill their formal obligations to the state through informal 
activities, such as participation in the commercial activities outside the plan. 
they invite private investments to make the production process going on 
or lease facilities to private entrepreneurs, and report their share of profits 
as plan fulfillment and send obligatory payments to the center (yang mun 
Su 2005, 1-53). They also receive payments from their own workers and, in 
return, excuse them from attendance at job places, so that they can engage in 
their own commercial activities. The revenues thereby generated by the state 
firms are reported as part of fulfillment of obligatory cash plan. The collective 
farms make income by leasing their land to state firms for cultivating food 
crops, and reporting it as part of cash plan fulfillment (choi Jin I 2012, 137-
145). Some state firms produce goods both for plan delivery and for market 
sale order to fulfill the state plan without resources from above and to survive 
in market conditions. they reduce the quality and increase the quantity of 
goods for plan delivery to fulfill the plan at least nominally, while keeping the 
quality of goods for market sale high enough for real sale. 
As formal and informal are not clearly separable in north Korean 
economy, it should be understood as hybrid one. the economic analysis 
asserts that informal sectors or market activities can be defined as self-
support activities of secondary economic agents such as small state firms and 
households. The other parts of the economy are presumed to be still under 
direction of the state plan and make up the formal sector. As described above, 
however, not only secondary economic agents but also powerful regime 
organizations are involved in commercial activities for self-support. In a 
nutshell, the economic entities, including those presumably to belong to the 
plan or formal sector according to the economic analysis, are also engaged in 
market activities. Then, it is not clear how to differentiate the formal from the 
informal sectors. It is rather to be understood that the formal and informal 
are combined and not separable in north Korea. 
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5.  Regime Security and the Political Manipulation of the Market
the economic analysis asserts that market expansion tends to undermine 
regime security, while the political analysis contends that the former does 
not necessarily endanger the latter. The economic analysis tends to perceive 
the “market as a source of new power, which may challenge the traditional 
state” (Kim and yang 2012, 145). It is asserted that the informal economy 
presumably weakens the formal one and the dispersion of market values 
damage the ideological basis of socialism, and in the end undermines the 
socialist planned economy (Kim et al. 2012, 17). In contrast, according to 
the political analysis, although market expansion poses some challenges 
to regime security, the regime has been successful in taking advantage of 
it to enhance its financial chance of survival and to tighten its grip on the 
economy. 
how does the political analysis explain that market expansion contributes 
to regime security? the main reason has been that the regime and its 
organizations have been maintained by revenues from commercial activities 
in the market. As stated earlier, the north Korean regime assigns commercial 
privileges and protection to regime organizations and loyal groups, and allows 
them to earn their own income (Park hyeong Jung 2011, 214). choi Bong 
dae asserts that “the foreign currency earning activities of the privileged 
state organizations are done upon the constraints of rent-distribution by 
the dictator and the market is the part of economic space, where the rents 
are realized through activities of export and import” (2011, 13). In other 
words, “the essence of market activation is to realize rent opportunities of the 
privileged regime organizations, which contribute to regime security.” (choi 
Bong dae 2011, 14)
the regime resorts to repression and control of the market in general 
and individual market entities even if the market expansion contributes to 
regime security. The regime allows the market to expand in order to extract 
resources more efficiently and then to redistribute them politically among 
loyal groups to ensure continued payoffs and loyalty. the problem is that 
the market may not expand in the same ways and directions as the regime 
wishes. Then, the regime must constantly intervene in the market, correct the 
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course of its expansion. It must be said that the regime has been successful in 
doing so, because there have been virtually no constraints on its domestic and 
economic policy.
three points are therefore worth mentioning. First, when the regime 
restricts market activities, the revenues from corruption of the regime 
organizations and officials in charge of its implementation tend to increase. 
If the market is regulated, political connections are more important than 
entrepreneurial talent (nee and opper 2010). restrictions on the market 
significantly increase the negotiating power of the agencies and officials of 
the regime in relation to participants in the market and produce favorable 
conditions for the former to increase revenues from corrupt payments. In the 
end, such measures change resource distribution among market participants 
in favor of those who support the regime. In reality, after restrictions on the 
market were imposed in the second half of 2007, the connection between 
power and money has been strengthened, and law enforcement officials have 
enjoyed better conditions for enrichment through payoffs from corruption 
(Kim and yang 2012, 55-104; choi dae Seok et al. 2010, 35-48). the 
strengthening of market repressive measures coincided with the appointment 
of Jang Seong taek as chief of Administrative department at the central 
party in charge of police, judiciary and prosecution in october 2007. during 
the subsequent transition of power from Kim Jong-Il to Kim Jong-un, mr. 
Jang and other internal security organizations have been promoted. these 
interventions in the market have redistributed the wealth in favor of pro-
regime elements in society, at the expense of the rest of the population. 
Second, the repressive measures are intended to inhibit the growth of 
potentialities for independence on the side of the regime agencies, localities 
and individuals on the base of increased wealth in the process of market 
expansion. Some of the each group may earn enough wealth and accumulate 
horizontal connections to dream about weakening their subservience to 
the center. this may increase potential challenges to the regime. therefore, 
the regime needs preventive “inspections for anti-socialist phenomena” on 
subsidiary organizations and extra extractions of wealth from the population. 
There have already been several attempts to inhibit regime agencies, localities, 
and individuals from amassing too much wealth and increase the potential 
for independence from the center, including the leadership purge of the 
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Sixth Armed Forces in 1996, and inspections for anti-socialist phenomena 
for hyesan city in 2000 (lim Keun o 2010; Park hyeong Jung 2011, 231-
232). In addition, there have been frequent mergers and abolitions of 
trading companies run by military units. The money exchanges measures in 
november 2009 were another attempt to weaken the financial power held by 
some segments of the rich population. 
Third, the repressive measures are intended to change the distribution of 
rents among regime organizations. Kim Jong-Il has rearranged the system of 
foreign trade licenses among regime organizations depending on changing 
importance of their contribution to regime survival including creation, 
merger and abolition of trading companies. the more the top leader can 
make the competition intensive to get monopoly licenses from him among 
regime organizations, the more revenue he can collect (congleton and 
lee 2008). Both Kim Jong-Il or Kim Jong-un have changed assignments of 
licenses for foreign currency earning activities depending on the imperatives 
of regime survival (Park hyeong Jung at al. 2009, 23-72; Good Friends 2011; 
Joongang daily, July 27, 2012).
6.  The Political Structure of Personal Dictatorship, its Influence on the 
Economy and the Character of Market
the political analysis derives the characteristics of north Korean market 
from the system of personal dictatorship. choi Bong dae describes the 
north Korean political system as “personal dictatorship with neopatrimonial 
characteristics,” in which the dictator maintains his rule over regime 
organizations and elites through construction of exclusive and monopolistic 
system of distributing rents, in north Korea through mainly trading rights. 
For this purpose, the dictator must maintain monopolistic control rights over 
sources of rent extraction (choi Bong dae 2011, 209). hong min suggests 
redefining the term Suryeong (absolute dictator) economy to describe “the 
totality of all economic relations” (2012, 57). According to him, the Suryeong 
economy is is “a mechanism of systemic integration of all elements, which 
enable him the absolute monopoly over politics and economy” (hong min 
2012, 57). Park hyeong Jung adds that “the structure of the economy and the 
market reflects the political system of extreme centralization of power on the 
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dictator as well as the ‘unitary’ hierarchy of power structure” (2012, 3). 
V. concluSIon 
the market in north Korea has been mainly understood as an economic 
phenomenon. Accordingly the economic analysis has dominated research on 
the market in north Korea. Its contributions have framed the understanding 
of the north Korean market. There have been some pitfalls in the economic 
understanding of market in north Korea. The political analysis supplies more 
appropriate and differentiated view points while emphasizing the inseparable 
relationship between that country’s politics and economy. 
the political analysis differentiates itself from the economic one in four 
ways. First, the political analysis asserts that the market in north Korea is 
embedded in the realities of power, while the economic analysis regards the 
market as independent area from the political power. The economic structure 
including the market and the distribution of economic resources reflect the 
social distribution of power. The market does not exist and operate outside 
of power relations. The more inequitable the power distribution is, the more 
inequitable the economic structure and the distribution of resources are. 
Second, the political analysis asserts that markets are structured and 
function differently in each country according to different political power 
relations. In contrast, the economic analysis assumes that, markets tend to 
operate along similar lines, no matter where they are located. For example, 
the economic analysis assumes that the markets in South and north Koreas 
are the same economic mechanisms. In contrast, according to the political 
analysis, they are different ones. the latter point out that South Korea’s 
market is embedded in inclusive institutions, while north Korea’s is a part of 
extractive institutions and helps to maintain privileges and rents extraction 
through political entry barriers.
Third, the leading actors in the market expansion are assumed differently. 
the economic analysis assumes that “secondary economic entities” such as 
small state firms and households are the market actors, whose distributive 
and productive activities for subsistence make up the market activities. In 
contrast, the political analysis asserts that the drivers of market expansion 
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are the privileged companies run by powerful regime organizations. the 
market in north Korea is hierarchical, in which the privileged companies at 
the top control the resource producers and retailers at the bottom. This kind 
of market based on monopolistic hierarchy exploits the weak so that the rich 
becomes richer and the poor becomes poorer.
Fourth, the two political and economic interpretations have different 
views of the market’s political effect. The economic analysis insists that market 
poses a serious threat to the planned economy and the regime. The political 
analysis emphasizes the role of market expansion for the regime survival and 
the regime’s control of the economy. According to this theory, north Korean 
leaders and regime organizations can intervene, structure and manipulate 
to subordinate the economy, especially the market, to regime survival and 
privilege maintenance, while taking advantage of overwhelming power 
and comprehensive public competence. In the end, the market expansion 
in north Korea is framed in a hierarchical structure in support of realizing 
the interests of the dictator and the regime organizations. constant political 
interventions in the market perpetuate the market’s subservience to the state, 
while constantly revising and restructuring the market. 
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